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Thomas Bassett Macaulay and the Bahamas: Racism, Business, and Canadian 
Sub-Imperialism 
In 1911, Thomas Bassett Macaulay, a Montreal insurance magnate, launched a 
campaign to have the Bahamas incorporated into Canada. Macaulay thought that the 
annexation of the Bahamas would encourage other colonies in the British West Indies 
to become Canadian provinces. Macaulay’s handling of the delicate issue of race 
shows that he was remarkably progressive for a Canadian imperialist of his 
generation: Macaulay denounced discrimination on the basis of skin colour and said 
that he wanted to grant Black Bahamians full political rights once they joined Canada. 
However, Macaulay’s plan was soon frustrated by the prevailing conviction that it was 
unfeasible to incorporate a jurisdiction with a Black majority into Canada. In 1912, 
Canada negotiated a simple trade agreement with the British West Indies rather than 
the political union Macaulay had formerly envisioned. This article will suggest that 
Macaulay’s initiative failed, in part, because of anxieties about ‘race’ in Canada, in the 
West Indies, and within the Colonial Office. These anxieties, along with the actions of 
the maladroit governor of the Bahamas, helped to kill the plans to include the islands 
in Canada.  
Macaulay’s liberal views stand in sharp contrast to those of Sir Robert Borden, 
Canada’s Prime Minister between 1911 and 1920. In 1916, when the annexation of 
Jamaica by Canada was being discussed, Borden opined that the acquisition of 
‘subject races’ by Canada would be a good thing because it would assimilate 
 2 
conditions within the Dominion to those prevailing in the British Empire as a whole.1 
Borden envisioned Jamaica as a sort of colony under the paternalistic administration 
of white officials appointed by Ottawa. The island would be Canada’s reward for 
sending young men to the trenches of the Western Front. Similar assumptions 
informed the wartime discussions of the possible annexation of other territories by 
Canada. Greenland, Trinidad, and Antigua were all candidates considered for 
annexation by Canadian officials. In every case, it was assumed that these territories 
would not be represented in the Dominion parliament and would instead be 
administered as colonies. Considered in isolation, Borden’s racist comments can be 
used to reinforce the thesis that racism was an inherent part of Canada’s sub-
imperialism.2 In contrast, Macaulay’s thoughts and actions bolster the view that 
racism and Canadian imperialism were not necessarily linked. In early twentieth 
century Canada, it was possible to be non-racist and a staunch imperialist.   
Macaulay’s experience forces us to develop a more nuanced view of the 
relationship between race and imperialism than has hitherto been presented. In recent 
years, historians in Canada and the other former ‘White Dominions’ have 
rediscovered the British Empire’s impact on their countries. They have explored the 
ways in which the Dominions were shaped by their membership in the imagined 
                                                 
1 Borden to Sir George Perley, 3 June 1916, in Sir Robert Borden Fonds, Library and 
Archives Canada, microfilm C-4314. Borden’s comments have been cited in the existing 
historical literature on Canada’s wartime plans for southern expansion Wigley, ‘Canada 
and Imperialism’; Samaroo, ‘The Politics of Disharmony’. 
2 In this context, sub-imperialism refers to the desire of British Dominions to acquire 
colonies of their own. The Australian-run territory of Papua was an example of sub-
imperialism in practice. For Australia’s efforts to build a sub-Empire in the Pacific, see 
Thompson, Australian Imperialism. 
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community of the British World.3 ‘Race’ has been a major theme of the British World 
historiography.4 Many historians emphasise that ideas regarding the inherent 
inferiority of particular ethnic and racial groups were an integral part of the ideology 
of British imperialism.5  For instance, race is a major theme of Adele Perry’s study of 
British Columbia’s place in the British World.6 The recent literature on Australia’s 
place in the British World stresses that ideas of racial superiority were intertwined 
with Australia’s British identity. This identity was, in turn, connected to both the 
White Australia immigration policy and Australian sub-imperialism.7  
 
The conclusion one might draw from the secondary literature showing that 
racism and British imperialism were linked is that the White Dominions might have 
been less racist had they not been part of the British Empire. Such a conclusion would 
be, at best, a dramatic over-simplification. Racism was indeed an important strand in 
British imperial thought and practice, but there were countervailing tendencies at 
work. One of these was the imperial government’s long track record of restraining the 
racism of the white Dominions. For a mixture of ethical and pragmatic reasons, the 
Colonial Office had frequently intervened to protect both aboriginals and non-white 
                                                 
3 Buckner, Canada and the British Empire; Buckner and Francis, Canada and the British 
world. Much of the Canadian literature builds on Carl Berger’s insight that in the period 
1867-1914, Canadian nationalism and loyalty to Britain were compatible and mutually 
reinforcing strains in Canadian thought. Berger, Sense of Power. 
4 Lorimer, ‘From Victorian Values To White Virtues’; Hall, ‘What Did a British World 
Mean’; Hirst, ‘Empire, State, Nation’; Carter, ‘Aboriginal People’. 
5 Hall, Civilising Subjects; McClintock, Imperial Leather; Burton, Burdens of History;  
6 Perry, On The Edge of Empire. 
7 Richards, ‘Migrations’; Ward, ‘Security’, 245-6. 
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migrants from governments elected by white settlers.8 Another countervailing 
tendency was the strong assimilationist or ‘civilisational’ tradition in British thought 
that favoured the integration of non-whites into British culture rather than their 
segregation and exclusion.9  As Douglas Lorimer has observed, in ‘the long nineteenth 
century, the discourse of race can be characterized as a contest between voices for the 
assimilation of colonial others and those advocating forms of separate development or 
racial exclusion’.10 These two traditions, segregationist racism and the assimilation 
project, were equally compatible with British imperialism, as both held that the culture 
of the colonising group was superior to that of the colonised.11 However, it would be a 
mistake to conflate the two traditions by labelling the British World as monolithically 
racist.  
 The politics of race in Canada in the early twentieth century reflected the 
complexity of British thinking in this period. In the eyes of imperialist Canadians such 
as Thomas Bassett Macaulay, the chief threat to the British Empire was not the non-
white ‘Other’, but rather the growing influence of the United States (i.e., a state 
governed by fellow Anglo-Saxons). As Edward Parliament Kohn has shown, racialist 
                                                 
8 Miller, ‘Petitioning’, 303-15; Huttenback, Racism and Empire, 183-8; Offer, The First 
World War, 176-197. 
9 Peter Mandler contrasts the ‘civilisational’ tradition rooted in the Scottish 
Enlightenment with biological or organic concepts of race and nationality. He argues that 
British conservatives made few ‘significant moves towards organic nationalism’ before 
the First World War and that ‘a comparatively weak, non-racial, non-organic idea of 
nation’ informed their thinking. Mandler, ‘Race and Nation’, 244. 
10 Lorimer, ‘From Victorian Values to White Virtues’, 110. 
11 As the research of Peter Henshaw has shown, there was also a third tradition that might 
be labelled as ‘imperialist-multiculturalist’. Henshaw demonstrated that as Governor-
General Lord Tweedsmuir encouraged Canadians to celebrate their ethnic diversity. See 
Peter Henshaw ‘John Buchan’.   
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theories that stressed the importance of common Anglo-Saxon ancestry led some 
Canadians in this period to embrace the idea of closer cooperation with the United 
States and the fellowship of all English-speaking peoples.12 Macaulay was not part of 
this group. Like many other opponents of the 1911 Canada-United States Reciprocity 
Agreement, Macaulay rejected the project of continental integration precisely because 
he favoured a Canada closely connected to Britain. Macaulay saw the annexation of 
the tropical territories as a means of strengthening Canada and the Empire vis-à-vis 
the Republic. 
Macaulay’s campaign also causes us to think about the role of race in the 
process by which various British territories in North America were united to form the 
Dominion of Canada. Race influenced which territories were included, which were 
excluded, and the terms on which they were admitted to Canada. The assumptions 
about which territories merited local self-government were indeed racial. By the early 
twentieth century, the Dominion consisted of self-governing ‘provinces’ in the 
temperate south and northern ‘territories’ with aboriginal majorities. The latter were 
administered by appointed officials. Although the criteria for local home rule were not 
explicitly racial, the proportion of whites in the local population determined the status 
of a territory; the Canadian Prairies were given local home rule only after they had 
acquired a sizeable white population.13 This implicitly racial constitutional 
arrangement mirrored the situation in the Empire of which Canada was a part: the 
                                                 
12 Kohn, This Kindred People. 
13 Participants in the debate on home rule for the Canadian Prairies used the euphemism 
‘qualified voter’ rather than the more direct term ‘white’. However, they were clearly 
speaking about people of European ancestry. Thomas, The Struggle for Responsible 
Government, 133-4, 138. 
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Empire’s ‘White Dominions’ enjoyed internal autonomy and democratic institutions, 
while other territories were administered, sometimes brutally, by white officials sent 
out from Britain.14 Macaulay’s campaign to make the Bahamas, which was inhabited 
by English-speaking and largely Protestant Blacks, into a Canadian ‘province,’ raised 
awkward questions for Canada, a country then confronting a host of linguistic, ethnic, 
and confessional issues. 
Canadian historians have expended little effort in explaining why the various 
plans to acquire territory in the West Indies failed.  Robin Winks, the author of the most 
thorough study of Canadian interest in tropical expansion to date, argued that the union 
initiative of 1911-1912 would have failed, ‘even had the Colonial Office stood behind’ its 
promoters. His reasoning was that many of the federations created by Britain’s Colonial 
Office were short-lived and that ‘artificially and externally enlarged’ political units have 
a natural tendency to fail.15 Given that Winks published this work in 1968, just after the 
collapse of several British colonial federations, it is easy to see why he arrived at this 
interpretation. However, his explanation is untenable because Canada is itself a highly 
artificial entity. Canada had been put together in the 1860s by the Colonial Office 
working in conjunction with a small clique of businessmen and cooperative colonial 
politicians.16 Moreover, Canada has survived for several generations despite being an 
‘artificially and externally enlarged’ polity. Nova Scotia is much closer to the British 
West Indies than it is to Vancouver, so it is futile to point to geography as the sole 
                                                 
14 Hall, Civilising Subjects, 395. 
15 Winks, Canadian-West Indian Union, 44. 
16 Martin, Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation; Smith, British 
Businessmen. 
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explanation for why these British territories were not joined to Canada. Historians need to 
integrate race into their explanations as to why Canada failed to expand into the West 
Indies.  Race was probably the most important single factor that undermined the plans for 
tropical expansion. Whether the Bahamas could ever have become ‘Canada’s Florida’ is 
an interesting counterfactual, but the fact other industrialised democracies have 
politically-integrated départements outre-mer suggests that the geographical or non-racial 
barriers involved were not insurmountable. The fact the Bahamas were separated from 
Canada by salt water did not, by itself, doom Macaulay’s initiative. 
The Bahamas are an archipelago south east of Florida. Nassau, the capital, is 
located on New Province island, which is at the same latitude as the Florida Keys. In 
1911, the colony had about 65,000 people. Most of the population were Black or 
mixed race, although on some islands whites were in the majority. Many of members 
of the white mercantile elite of Nassau were of United Empire Loyalist descent and 
could trace their ancestry back to the southern United States.17 Nassau’s oligarchy was 
known by the metonym ‘Bay Street’, which was the main commercial street of 
Nassau.  
In constitutional terms, the Bahamas occupied a position between the self-
governing White Dominions and a Crown colony. Britain’s Crown Colonies were 
ruled by a governor whose authority was not checked by an elected assembly, and the  
legislative functions were delegated to an unelected council consisting of the 
                                                 
17 Similarly, many English-speaking Canadians could trace the ancestors to the Loyalists 
who fled the northern colonies during the Revolution. For the Loyalist migration to the 
Bahamas, see Prokopow, ‘To the Torrid Zones’, 117-30. 
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Governor and his appointees. In the Bahamas, however, there was an elected House of 
Assembly of the sort familiar to students of pre-1840s Canadian history. Responsible 
Government on the Canadian model had not been introduced in the Bahamas because 
Britain’s Colonial Office thought that self-government was inappropriate in a colony 
with a non-white majority. On the other hand, the Bahamas had escaped the fate of 
most of the other West Indian colonies, which had been deprived of their elective 
assemblies in the decades after the end of slavery.18 The criteria for voting in the 
Bahamas made no reference to race and many Blacks had enough property to enjoy 
the franchise. Nevertheless, the colony’s legislature was dominated by whites and only 
three of its twenty-nine members were Black.19 Discrimination against Blacks, 
although very real, was less virulent than in the southern United States. Contemporary 
American visitors to the Bahamas were struck by the relative absence of prejudice, 
such as the desegregation of amenities. 20    
Thomas Macaulay’s business career had significant overseas dimensions that 
help explain his interest in the Bahamas. His father, Robertson Macaulay, had 
migrated to Canada in 1854 from Scotland. Thomas was born in Hamilton in 1860, 
where his father was an insurance salesman. From 1875 to 1908, Robertson served as 
                                                 
18 Parry and Sherlock, Short History of the West Indies, 212; West India Committee 
Circular, ‘The Status of the Bahamas,’ 11 February 1913, 59. 
19 Sir William Grey-Wilson, Governor of the Bahamas, to Vernon Harcourt, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, 6 May 1911, file 16891, Colonial Office 23/267 in National 
Archives (United Kingdom). 
20 However, there was a striking demonstration of segregation during the First World 
War, when Bahamian Black volunteers were placed in the West Indian regiment, while 
local whites were sent to serve with the Canadian Expeditionary Force. Craton and 
Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 2: 91, 228; Johnson, Post-Emancipation Race 
Relations in the Bahamas. 
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the managing director of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Montreal. Under 
Robertson’s stewardship, Sun Life grew into the largest insurance provider in the 
Dominion. By the 1880s, the firm had agents in every province of Canada, even 
distant British Columbia.21  
Thomas Macaulay joined the firm at the age of seventeen, and devoted several 
years to mastering the body of knowledge required by the Institute of Actuaries, which 
was the governing body for the profession in England, Wales, and the settlement 
colonies.22 Thomas’s ability to calculate risks was put to use when he accompanied 
his father on an 1879 trip to determine the feasibility of insuring people in the West 
Indies. Early Sun Life policies followed the widespread British practice of prohibiting 
customers from living south of 33 degrees 33 minutes latitude. The statistics compiled 
by Thomas demonstrated that the mortality rates in the West Indies need not preclude 
issuing policies there at a profit. Sun Life introduced a new type of policy without the 
customary restrictions on geography. Sun Life’s world-wide coverage paved the way 
for rapid expansion in the Caribbean, where agencies were soon established.23  
Sun Life’s move into the region was part of a broader pattern. As H.V. Nelles 
and Chris Armstrong demonstrate in their study of Canadian investment in the 
Caribbean and Latin America, there was a southward rush of Canadian firms in this 
                                                 
21 The Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada: an Outline History, 12; Obituary for 
Thomas Bassett Macaulay, Times, 6 April 1942, 6. 
22 Macaulay wrote second level associate exams in 1897. In that year, the Institute held 
examinations in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Montreal and Toronto. See Journal of the 
Institute of Actuaries 33 (1897), 440. 
23 Schull, The Century of the Sun, 12, 20. 
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period.24 The West Indies, however, were not the only overseas market Sun Life 
pursued. In the early 1890s, agencies were established in China, India, Singapore, and 
Japan. For many years, the head of Sun Life’s operations in India was Sir Phiroze C. 
C. Kharshedji Sethna, a Parsee merchant best known to historians for his involvement 
in Bombay’s film industry and the Tata industrial empire.25 Sun Life’s willingness to 
employ a non-white person as the head of its operations in British India is suggestive 
of liberal attitudes on the part of its Canadian managers. The settlement in 1894 of a 
legal dispute with Sun Life, an unrelated British firm which chanced to have the same 
name, permitted expansion across the Atlantic. By 1900, Sun Life of Canada had 
established agencies in London and other British cities.  Agents were also appointed in 
France and the Low Countries.  
1895 saw Sun Life’s first attempts to penetrate the United States market with 
the establishment of an agency in the border city of Detroit. The company gradually 
established a presence in a number of states but did not sell policies in the most 
populous states of the Union.26  Macaulay’s ambivalence towards the United States 
that was typically Canadian.  Macaulay certainly had no objections to insuring 
American lives or to investing in American firms such as the Illinois Street Traction 
                                                 
24 Quigley, ‘The Bank of Nova Scotia in the Caribbean, 1889-1940’; Baum, The Banks of 
Canada in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 21; Armstrong and Nelles, Southern Exposure. 
25 Schull, Century of the Sun, 34, 61, 67, 102; Brian Shoesmith ‘From Monopoly to 
Commodity: The Bombay Studios in the 1930s’; Misra, ‘Business Culture' and 
Entrepreneurship in British India, 1860-1950’, 335; Tomlinson, ‘Colonial Firms and the 
Decline of Colonialism in Eastern India 1914-47’, 457.  
26 Schull, Century of the Sun, 35-37. 
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Company.27 In politics, however, his preference was that Canada should negotiate 
trade agreements with the countries of the British Empire rather than rely on exports 
to the United States.28 Canada had taken an important step towards imperial 
preference in 1897, when the Laurier government had granted Britain preference in 
the Canadian market. This meant that British goods entering Canada would pay lower 
customs duties than equivalent foreign, chiefly American, goods. In 1898, Canada 
extended this tariff preference to the British possessions in the West Indies. In 1900, 
the preference for British and British colonial goods was increased.29 In addition to 
implementing a form of imperial preference, the Canadian government encouraged 
trade with the British West Indies via new shipping subsidies. In 1899, the Canadian 
and British governments began a joint subsidy to allow Messrs Pickford and Black to 
operate a fortnightly steamer service connecting Halifax with Bermuda, St. Lucia, 
Barbados, and Trinidad. A monthly run to the less populous islands of St. Kitts, 
Antigua, Montserrat, St. Vincent, Grenada, and Tobago was also started.30 These 
policies encouraged some of the West Indian colonies to re-orient their trade to 
                                                 
27 Drummond, ‘Canadian Life Insurance Companies and the Capital Market, 1890-1914’, 
218; Truth, 5 June 1912,  1424, financial editor’s reply to ‘Alpha’ and ‘Cawnpore’; 
Nassau Guardian, ‘Truth and Mr. Macaulay: the Bull Moose of Insurance’ 7 August 
1912, 2. 
28 Canada West India Magazine, June 1911, T.B. Macaulay, ‘Imperial Trade and 
Imperial Defence’, 20-21. 
29  Hart, A Trading Nation, 73; Memoranda  ‘West Indian Commercial Relations with 
Canada and the United States of America’ p.6 in ‘Trade Relations Between Canada and 
the West Indies.’ CO 884/10. 
30 Times, 29 December 1899, ‘The West Indies’, 10; D. Morris, Imperial Commissioner 
of Agriculture for the West Indies to Colonial Office, 9 September 1903, printed in 
‘Correspondence Relating to the Steamship Service between Canada and the West Indies’ 
p.1-2,  in CO 884/10; ‘Minutes of Conference Relating the Trade Relations between the 
West Indies and the Dominion of Canada’, 17 January 1908, in ‘Trade Relations Between 
Canada and the West Indies.’, p.178 in  CO 884/10. 
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Canada. For instance, in the eight years after 1900, Canada went from being of 
negligible importance to being the single most important market for British Guyana’s 
sugar exporters. 31 Barbados experienced a similarly rapid shift in the destination of its 
sugar: between 1902 and 1909, the percentage going to the Dominions of Canada and 
Newfoundland soared from 27.1 to 72.9.32  
At a meeting in Halifax in 1905, the Maritime Board of Trade passed a resolution 
calling for the inclusion of the British West Indies in Canadian Confederation. Support 
for union was particularly strong in Nova Scotia, which had traditional trade ties to 
Bermuda and the West Indies.33 Race factored into Canadian reactions to the Maritime 
Board of Trade’s proposal. Sir Wilfred Laurier, the Liberal Prime Minister, declared that 
a political union with the West Indies was impracticable in view of distance and ‘ethnical 
origin.’ He declared that the Canadian Manufacturers’ Association’s rival proposal for a 
reciprocal free trade agreement with the West Indies was much more feasible.34 Laurier’s 
view that different ethnic origins precluded union is especially curious, given that he was 
a French Canadian from Québec. Nevertheless, Laurier never wavered from his view that 
the West Indian colonies would not make suitable Canadian provinces. However, when 
the President of the West India Electric Company, a Canadian tramway and utility 
                                                 
31  Table, ‘Value of Exports from British Guyana’ in  Colonial Office memorandum, 
August 1909, in  ‘West Indian Commercial Relations with Canada and the United States 
of America’, p.10 in CO 884/10. 
32 Beckles, A History of Barbados, 141, table 17, ‘Value of Barbados Exports to the USA 
and Canada, 1902-1914’. 
33 Times, ‘Canada and the West Indies’ 24 August 1905,   6. The concept was not itself 
new and had been discussed in the 1880s.  See Stewart, ‘Canadian—West Indian Union, 
1884–1885’. 
34 Sir Wilfred Laurier to John S. Irwin, 20 February 1905, Sir Wilfred Laurier Fonds, 
Library and Archives Canada, microfilm C-820; Laurier to George Johnson, 8 May 1905 
ibid, C-822; Laurier to F.T. Frost, 5 September 1906 in ibid, C-837.  
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conglomerate, suggested Confederation with Jamaica in 1909, Laurier replied that 
Canada might be willing to rule the colony in the same way that the United States 
administered Puerto Rico. Puerto Ricans, it should be pointed out, were attached to the 
United States for tariff purposes but could not vote in American elections.35 In other 
words, Laurier was willing to consider quasi-colonial rule by Canada, but not 
Confederation on equal terms. 
The growth of Canadian interest in the West Indies after 1900 coincided with 
changing attitudes on the part of the West India Committee (WIC), the powerful 
London-based association that represented West Indian merchants and absentee 
planters. When the Dominion had suggested a Canada- British West Indies reciprocity 
agreement in 1890, the WIC had condemned the proposal as a provocative act liable to 
endanger access to the American market.36  However, the increased tariff protection 
given by the United States to sugar producers in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto 
Rico after the Spanish-American War forced the WIC to re-evaluate their view of the 
United States. As WIC Chairman Sir Neville Lubbock explained to a delegation of 
Canadian manufacturers in 1905, while the planters had previous regarded trade with 
the United States as ‘the salvation of the West Indies’, they were now prepared to 
consider reciprocity with Canada. They no longer trembled in fear of American tariff 
                                                 
35 James Hutchinson to Laurier, 9 July 1909; Laurier to Hutchinson, 20 July 1909 in ibid, 
C878. 
36 Lubbock, to Lord Knutsford, dated 15 January 1891, reprinted in Memorandum, 
August 1909,  ‘West Indian Commercial Relations With  Canada and the United States of 
America’, p.6,  CO 884/10. 
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retaliation.37 The West India Committee therefore greeted the 1905 resolution of the 
Maritime Board of Trade with open minds. Their organ, the West India Committee 
Circular, argued that while the West Indies had no desire to pass under the Stars and 
Stripes, Union with the Dominion might be the solution to the islands’ problems: 
‘Canada may be in a position to do for the West Indies what the United States is doing 
for Cuba and Puerto Rico.’38 
The Colonial Office, however, remained sceptical of the concept of Canada-West 
Indies reciprocity and was dead set against actual political union.39 In August 1909, 
Britain’s Free-Trade Liberal government overcame its aversion to imperial preferential 
tariffs, a sine qua non of reciprocity, and appointed a Royal Commission to study how to 
promote trade between Canada and the West Indies. Extensive hearings were held in 
Canada and the islands and large numbers of businessmen presented their views on the 
advisability of the measure. In early 1910, the Commission recommended that the West 
Indian colonies be allowed to negotiate a trade agreement with Canada.  In Ottawa, the 
Laurier government said it was willing to open negotiations the moment the West Indian 
                                                 
37 Memorandum, August 1909, ‘West Indian Commercial Relations With  Canada and 
the United States of America’, p.10 CO 884/10; West India Committee Circular, ‘Canada 
and the West Indies’ 4 July 1905, 263-4. For Lubock’s address to a delegation from the 
Canadian Manufacturers’ Association see ibid, ‘Luncheon for the Canadian Visitors’ 3 
July 1911, 261-2. 
38 West India Committee Circular, editorial, 31 August 1905, 342-3. 
39 Colonial Office Memorandum, August 1909, ‘West Indian Commercial Relations With  
Canada and the United States of America’, CO 884/10. 
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islands were ready to negotiate en bloc. Talks between the various colonies aimed at 
sorting out internal differences began.40  
Looming over the proposal for a Canada-West Indies trade agreement was the 
Reciprocity Agreement with the United States announced by Laurier in late January 
1911.41 Guaranteeing free trade in most natural products, the agreement evoked strong 
responses in Canada. Part the opposition to the agreement came from interest groups, 
while other Canadians opposed it on ideological grounds. 42   Robert Borden’s 
Conservative Party condemned the agreement on imperial grounds, arguing that the 
agreement would result in Canada’s economic and perhaps even political annexation 
by the United States. It would be far better, they said, to promote trade with the United 
Kingdom and its colonies. Some of Borden’s more extreme supporters questioned 
Laurier’s loyalty to the Crown. In Britain, the leaders of the Unionist or Conservative 
Party were appalled by the Reciprocity Agreement, since it appeared to preclude the 
creation of the system of Imperial Preference desired so strongly by the Tariff 
Reformers.43 The denunciations of the agreement in Britain were quoted with good 
effect by the Canadian Conservatives, who convinced many Canadians that the 
                                                 
40 Times, 16 August 1909, ‘Canada and the West Indies’, 7; ibid, ‘The West Indies and 
Canada’, 19 March 1910, 5;  Lord Balfour of Burleigh to John St Loe Strachey, 28 
September 1910, in Strachey Papers, House of Lords Record Office, STR/2/5/20. 
41 Ellis, Reciprocity, 1911, 77. 
42 Beaulieu and J Emery, ‘Pork Packers, Reciprocity, and Laurier's Defeat in the 1911 
Canadian  General Election’; Heath Macquarrie, ‘Robert Borden and the Election of 
1911’. 
43 Potter, ‘The imperial significance of the Canadian-American reciprocity proposals of 
1911’. 
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agreement would indeed threaten the unity of the Empire.44 Between January 1911 
and Laurier’s defeat in the federal general election in September, Reciprocity became 
the single most important political issue in Canada.  
Thomas Macaulay’s February 1911 visit to the Bahamas to promote political 
union with Canada thus came at an important juncture in Canadian history. It also 
coincided with the deepest point of a local economic depression that had been largely 
caused by the tariff policy of the United States.45  The stiff duties designed to protect 
Hawaiian producers established by the 1897 Dingley Tariff had choked off the flow of 
Bahamian pineapples to the United States, devastating the colony’s economy.46 The 
influx of tourist dollars cushioned the blow in Nassau, Bahama’s capital, but the 
impact on the colony’s smaller islands was severe. Large numbers of Bahamians fled 
to Florida to find work. Of the 5,000 ‘coloureds’ in Miami in 1910, 3,500 were from 
the Bahamas. 1911 was the peak year of the Miami emigration and the very trough of 
a difficult economic period.47   
The protectionism of the United States in this period helps to explain why 
many Bahamians saw trade with Canada as the solution to islands’ problems. Another 
economic factor that increased interest in Canada was the Royal Bank of Canada, 
which had established a branch in 1908 and played an increasingly important role in 
                                                 
44 However, most Canadians were probably skeptical of Rudyard Kipling’s claim that the 
Reciprocity Agreement would cause the Canadian murder rate to equalise with that of the 
United States. See Toronto Globe, ‘Notes and Comments’ 15 September 1911, 6. 
45 Randall, Mount, and Bright, The Caribbean Basin, 31-84; Bryan, The Jamaican 
People: 1880-1902, 7-8. 
46 Dilks, Neville Chamberlain,1:37; Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream, 2: 44. 
47 ‘Petition to the Governor of the Bahamas by Bahamians in Miami’, 27 October 1911, 
in CO 23/268; Craton and Saunders, Islanders in the Stream,  2: 219. 
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the local economy. Sentimental factors, such as a proud United Empire Loyalist 
heritage, reinforced the sense of affinity with Canada. In 1905, a branch of the 
Montreal-based Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire (IODE) was 
established in Nassau.48 Within the non-white population of the Bahamas, there was 
considerable resentment towards the United States, for Bahamian migrants in Florida 
had experienced a degree of racial violence unknown in the Bahamas. Judging by the 
elaborate celebration Black Bahamians in Miami held to celebrate the coronation of 
King George V in August 1911, some Black Bahamians identified strongly with the 
British Empire. In short, Bahamian Blacks appear to have subscribed to the imperial 
identity that British World scholars have shown was common in many British colonies 
in the era. 49  Macaulay exploited this identity in making his appeal for union with 
Canada.   
Macaulay’s allies in his campaign to bring the Bahamas into Canada included 
the Sun Life agent in Nassau, Alfred E. Moseley, who was the son of the proprietor of 
the Nassau Guardian. Mary Moseley, the paper’s editor, was a pillar of the local 
IODE. Another important ally was Dr G.J. Johnson, a Bay Street merchant who was a 
member of the Legislative Assembly and a director of the Bank of Nassau. 50  
Macaulay also brought several Canadians with him to help his campaign. One of them 
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was Archibald Chaussegros de Léry Macdonald, the Mayor of the Quebec town of 
Rigaud. At September 1911 federal election, Macdonald was to stand unsuccessfully 
as the Conservative candidate in that community.51  
Soon after Macaulay arrived in Nassau, Johnson called a public meeting to 
discuss union with Canada. Hundreds of leading citizens showed up to hear addresses 
by Macaulay, Macdonald, and George N. Cole, a member of the Bahamian Legislative 
Assembly. Macdonald’s speech emphasised that joining Canada would bring many 
financial boons. The moment the Bahamas became a province, the Dominion 
government would pay for the dredging of Nassau’s harbour. He also pointed out that 
Ottawa gave all Canadian provincial governments a per capita grant to fund schools 
and the other costs of local governments. Macaulay said that the ‘the Dominion would 
spend five dollars for every dollar of revenue contributed’ by Bahamians and that 
trade with Canada would be mutually beneficial, since the Bahamas and Canada 
produced complimentary commodities.  At the end of the meeting, a resolution was 
passed asking the Legislative Assembly to investigate the issue of Confederation with 
Canada.52  
The first meeting had been well attended by Nassau’s social elite. On 28 
February, a second and somewhat larger meeting was held to allow for ‘expressions of a 
more popular nature’.53 Macaulay’s remarks to this meeting touched on the issue of race. 
Macaulay told his audience that he had been asked to address ‘colour questions,’ but that 
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there was little to say, for ‘in Canada there was no more a colour line than there is in 
England.’ This statement was greeted with applause. He continued: ‘your coloured 
population would at all time be assured of absolutely fair and equal treatment.’ Macaulay 
falsely reported that legislation discriminating on the basis of race was unthinkable in 
Canada.54 Moreover, the Bahamas would be entitled to a fair proportion of the seats in 
the Dominion Parliament. With two MPs and a Senator to protect their interests, the 
position of coloured people would be even more secure.55 
 
Both of Nassau’s papers sounded notes of caution in their editorials on the 
Canadian initiative. The Nassau Tribune saw commercial benefits in joining the 
Dominion. It repeated Laurier’s prediction that the twentieth century would belong to 
Canada in the same way the nineteenth had belonged to the United States. However, it 
also reported that ‘an erroneous idea seems to exist in the public mind that such a union 
could be easily accomplished in a few months.’ It noted that Canadian Confederation had 
been first proposed in 1808 and that that the implementation of Confederation in 1867 
had been preceded by ‘a great number of conferences’. Union with Canada was a worthy 
goal, but it would take time.56 The Nassau Guardian expressed dismay over the credulity 
with which locals had received the ‘wildly improbable’ promises of the Canadians.  The 
paper flatly declared that it was unlikely that Canada would ever pay for the dredging of 
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the harbour, the promise it regarded as having had the greatest effect on local thinking.57 
One correspondent expressed disgust with the childish enthusiasm the Bay Street 
merchants had shown for the scheme, thinking it extremely unlikely that the ‘the 
Dominion will, for the asking, elevate a distant island community of 60,000 souls, mostly 
of the negro race, into the dignity of a Province and straightaway proceed to spend 
millions on us.’ A commercial agreement providing for the mutual reduction of tariffs 
was a far more realistic goal.58  
 
 The issue of joining Canada was raised in the House of Assembly on 13 March by 
W.B. Johnson, who proposed asking the imperial government for permission to appoint 
commissioners to negotiate for the admission of the Bahamas as a province. He stated 
that support for Confederation with Canada was not confined to Nassau and that public 
meetings on the Out Islands had come out in favour of it. George N. Cole supported the 
resolution, arguing that becoming part of Canada would improve the economy and stop 
the haemorrhage of people to the United States. He also pointed out that merely opening 
negotiations would not bind the legislature to any future course of action.  
 
 Not all members of the assembly agreed with the idea of Confederation with 
Canada. Bay Street merchant Kenneth Solomon opposed the resolution on the grounds of 
local patriotism. He said that ‘he had driven over Niagara Bridge and had experienced the 
delight of entering Canada and seeing the Union Jack’ fluttering in the breeze. However, 
fidelity to the Union Jack was trumped by the local loyalties represented by the conches 
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and pineapples on Bahamian postage stamps. He also argued that ‘from a commercial 
standpoint, it would be better to go to the United States with 90 millions of people than to 
Canada with 9 million.’ 59  A man named Sawyer, who was the local agent of the New 
York Steamship Company, denounced union with Canada.60 He said that the people of 
Jamaica had once been offered the chance to enter Canadian Confederation but had 
wisely turned it down.  Other speakers touched on the issue of race: a legislator named 
Anderson argued that the Canadian system of responsible government was unsuitable for 
the racially mixed population of the Bahamas. Despite these criticisms, the resolution in 
favour of opening negotiations with Canada passed by a vote of twenty-one to six.61  
 
The story on Macaulay’s activities carried in Canadian newspapers on 2 March 
1911 focused on the economic aspects of the scheme and did not introduce the issue of 
race. The Canadian Press wire service also exaggerated certain details, claiming that 
20,000 people had attended the meeting addressed by Macaulay.62 In Ottawa, Ontario 
Conservative MP, Thomas Sproule, spoke in favour of annexing the Bahamas.63 The 
journal of London’s Royal Colonial Institute, United Empire, favoured Macaulay’s 
proposal on the grounds that the British West Indies would soon need to choose between 
the Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack of Canada. It said that the Canadian option could 
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be made more attractive by inserting clauses protecting ‘coloured people’ into the British 
North America Act, the British statute that served as Canada’s constitution.64   
 
In Nassau, Governor Grey-Wilson asked the Colonial Office for guidance on 
whether he could comply with the Assembly’s request to open a pourparler. In his 
memorandum on the issue, Lewis Harcourt, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, noted 
that several Bahamians had advocated union with Canada on the grounds that as a 
province of Canada, they would be able to export fruit to the United States under the 
liberal terms of the January 1911 Reciprocity Agreement. He instructed Grey-Wilson to 
remind the islanders that the agreement explicitly excluded Canadian-grown pineapples 
and other tropical fruits from free entry into the United States. This clause had been 
inserted by a far-sighted American diplomat. He thought this clarity on this point would 
cause the ‘agitation’ in favour of union to fizzle out. 65 One of the civil servants in the 
Colonial Office thought that transferring the colony to Canada might hurt British trade, 
remarking that ‘the centre of gravity of Empire will leave England for Canada in less than 
a quarter of a century, but we do not wish to accelerate the process at our expense.’ 66 
 
The Colonial Office’s main reasons for disliking the proposed union related to 
racial issues. It should be remembered that one of the major administrative headaches 
facing the Colonial Office at this time was the immigration of non-white British subjects 
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into the self-governing Dominions.67 Indeed, Charles Prestwood Lucas, the head of the 
Colonial Office’s Dominions section, argued in a 1912 book that the colour question was 
the ‘greatest difficulty in the British Empire.’ According to Lucas, the chief threat to 
imperial unity was the desire of the white working classes of the Dominions to exclude 
non-white labour.68 Gilbert Grindle of the Office’s West India section maintained that 
Britain would be betraying the Blacks of the West Indies if it permitted Canada to annex 
them: ‘no doubt for the moment the Dominion government would safeguard their 
interests, but there are signs of the rise of a colour question in Canada and in any case it 
cannot be long before U.S. opinion gives the tone to Canada in regard the Negro.’69  The 
file dealing with Macaulay’s campaign contains a newspaper article on the growing 
hostility of Canadians to Black immigration.70 
 
Another Colonial Office official predicted that in the event of union, Canada 
would not extend full political rights to the Bahamas and would instead administer them 
‘as a sort of Canadian Crown Colony, much as Australia administers Papua.’71 Governor 
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Sir William Grey-Wilson later reported to the Colonial Office that some Bahamian 
Blacks opposed union with Canada out of fear that ‘the Canadian treatment of the Negro 
will prove more American than British.’ 72   
 
Convinced that the campaign in favour of union would soon fade away on its own 
accord, the Colonial Office resolved to do nothing for the time being. Meanwhile, 
Macaulay had returned to Montreal, where he wrote several letters to Laurier outlining 
the case for union with the Bahamas and possibly other West Indian territories.  
Macaulay’s arguments included the notion that the Blacks of the Bahamas were of a 
‘higher’ type than the Black underclass of the American South.73 Laurier’s responses to 
these letters, if any, do not appear to have survived.  Macaulay also formed an 
organization called the Canada West India League.74 The decision of Sir Thomas 
Shaughnessy of the Canadian Pacific Railway to serve as its Honorary President was 
probably connected to the CPR’s ongoing negotiations to establish a steamer service to 
the West Indies.75 In June, the League began publishing the Canada West India League 
Magazine, a monthly publication that extolled the benefits of Canada-West Indies trade 
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and closer political ties.76 The magazine carried advertisements for businesses ranging 
from Jamaican dry goods merchants to the mighty CPR. The Magazine assured the 
people of the West Indies that there would be many financial benefits if they became 
Canadian provinces. Guest articles by statesmen such as Sir Joseph Ward, Prime Minister 
of New Zealand, lent credence to the thesis that the proposed union would be good for 
the Empire as a whole. 77  
 
In late June and early July, there was a flurry of interest in Jamaica in 
Confederation with Canada, with some correspondents in the Kingston Gleaner coming 
out in favour of confederation with the ‘coming country of the world.’78 Unfortunately 
for proponents of the scheme, this discussion coincided with a wire service story about 
the Dominion’s government efforts to prevent a group of Blacks from Oklahoma from 
settling in the Canadian West.79  News of Canada’s actions appeared in publications 
throughout the British West Indies, including the Bahamas, prompting one correspondent 
in the Nassau Guardian to ridicule Macaulay’s claim that there was no colour line in 
Canada.80 D.A. Corinaldi, an elected member of Jamaica’s Legislative Council, 
condemned the rich merchants of Kingston for supporting union with Canada, stating that 
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‘the Negroes and the Mulattoes’ of the island would never abandon Britain for the 
Dominion. Canada’s loyalty to the Crown, he elaborated, was a false loyalty, similar to 
that which had once been professed by the Yankees. In the course of discussing the 
Canadian proposal, Corinaldi also denounced the ‘ “whitewashed Mulatoees” who put 
themselves down on the Census papers as Whites.’81 He seems to have been suggesting 
that the Bahamas wished to achieve something similar on a collective scale. 
 
In August, the Canada West India League Magazine tackled the concerns of 
Black West Indians by presenting material designed to show that Canadians were racially 
tolerant. It reprinted two lonely-hearts advertisements it said had recently appeared in an 
(unspecified) Montreal newspaper. The dark-skinned individuals described in the 
advertisements, a Jamaican man and a young lady from the Bahamas, were both seeking 
to marry fair-skinned people of ‘Canadian, English, Scotch, or Irish’ ancestry.  The 
Magazine wished the two potential suitors luck in finding a Canadian spouse and then 
added in a light-hearted vein that while much had been heard in Canada ‘of the 
annexation of Canada by the United States,’ perhaps the real danger was from West 
Indians seeking to ‘annex’ individual Canadians.82   
 Meanwhile, there was a change of government in the Dominion, for the 
September 1911 election brought Robert Borden’s Conservatives to power.  The 
election had an electric effect on advocates of imperial preference. The Nassau 
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Guardian rejoiced in the fact Ontario voters had remembered their ‘United Empire 
Loyalist’ ancestry and had voted against Reciprocity.83 It also suggested that the 
display of Bahamian and West Indian produce at Toronto’s exhibition may have 
influenced some votes.84 The Canada West India Magazine declared that ‘the same 
sentiment that helped kill Reciprocity with the United States will be the strongest 
factor in bringing about Reciprocity with the West Indies, or any other country owing 
allegiance to the King.’85 On 25 September 1911, Macaulay sent a letter to the paper 
discussing the implications of Borden’s victory for the Bahamas. Macaulay expressed 
his regrets that A. De Lery Macdonald had not been elected in Vaudreuil but said that 
even without Macdonald’s presence in the Commons, the new parliament would be 
more supportive of union with the Bahamas than the last.86 
 The Governor of the Bahamas, Sir William Grey-Wilson, had previously 
played a minor role in the union agitation. However, when he heard of the change of 
government in Canada, he decided to seize the opportunity. Grey-Wilson cancelled his 
customary autumn motor-car trip through New England and went to Canada to lobby 
for the annexation of the Bahamas with Canada. Grey-Wilson’s cousin was Lord 
Grey, Canada’s Governor-General. Unfortunately, none of Grey’s correspondence 
with his cousin has survived and we do not know what he thought of either the 
proposal to make the Bahamas part of the Dominion or his cousin’s endorsement of 
the scheme. We do know that Grey believed that Canada should play a much larger 
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role in the West Indies. In fact, he planned to visit the island on HMCS Niobe, a 
warship of the new Royal Canadian Navy, so as to awaken West Indians to the 
possibility of closer ties with Canada.87 Another clue to Grey’s thinking is provided 
by his response to the proposals for the annexation of Bermuda. When the Governor 
of Bermuda proposed Confederation with Canada as a way of counteracting the 
growing American influence in that colony, Grey’s reply, while non-committal, did 
not dismiss the idea. 88   
Grey-Wilson’s October 1911 speech to Toronto’s Empire Club touched on the 
racial implications of union with Canada, a topic that had been on his mind for 
months. Grey-Wilson presented the annexation of the Bahamas as an experiment that 
would allow Canada to decide whether it should acquire other islands in the British 
West Indies. He explained that while many Black Bahamians had the vote, the islands 
had evolved safeguards to limit Black participation. He elaborated that while the 
electorate was largely Black, ‘the black man almost invariably elects a white man to 
represent him.’ This system, he said, had spared the islands from the ‘horrors of the 
situation in the Southern States of America’. Even in the most isolated regions of the 
colony, white women were as secure as they would be in Toronto. Grey-Wilson also 
said that Confederation with Canada would require new safeguards, for local elections 
would be more consequential after a union than they were at present. He said that 
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while no explicit reference to race or colour should ever be made, union with Canada 
should coincide with the introduction of stiffer monetary requirements for electors. He 
conceded that such a franchise would shut out ‘some of the whites’ in the course of 
excluding most of the Blacks, but said that this was a necessary evil.89  
 The Governor’s remarks were reported in the Toronto papers and soon gained 
a wide circulation.90 In London, the Standard of Empire hailed Grey-Wilson’s 
Toronto speech, claiming that his franchise prescription was the magic solution 
needed to unify Canada and the Bahamas.91 The Governor’s remarks caused 
considerable embarrassment and frustration for the staff of the Colonial Office. 92 
Reactions in the Bahamas were highly mixed. Expressing the hope that the Governor 
had been misquoted, the Nassau Tribune argued that the existing electoral 
qualifications in the colony would work well for elections to the Dominion 
Parliament. The paper declared that its support for union with Canada was 
undiminished by the controversy over Grey-Wilson’s remarks, a comment which 
suggests that they had affected the thinking of others in the colony.  One 
correspondent opined that if annexation to Canada took place, ‘our young men 
(coloured) may stand no better chances, but they certainly will be no worse off.’93 
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 In November, the Nassau Guardian reported Grey-Wilson’s remarks and then 
declared that it was unimpressed with the arguments in favour of political union with 
Canada, as distinct from a trade agreement. It also connected the question of union to 
a recent report that a group of Black clergyman had experienced difficulties in finding 
hotel accommodation in Toronto. The paper remarked that well-dressed Blacks would 
not have experienced discrimination of this sort in Britain. Returning to the subject of 
Grey-Wilson’s remarks in December, the paper opined that the Dominion would never 
favour a sizeable Black electorate and that it wished to become the ‘overlord’ of the 
West Indies rather than to admit the islands on the basis of equality.94  The paper 
refrained from making any additional comments on Grey-Wilson during his remaining 
months as Governor of the Bahamas.   
On 9 April 1912, Canadian negotiations concluded a trade agreement with 
most of the British colonies in West Indies. The deal committed the West Indian 
colonies to admit specified Canadian agricultural goods at duties at 20% below those 
levied on similar goods from other countries. An additional preference for Canadian 
flour was also mandated. In return, Canada increased the preference accorded to sugar 
and other tropical commodities from the British West Indies. Canada also promised to 
improve the steamer service. The governments of Trinidad, British Guyana, Barbados, 
St Lucia, St Vincent, Antigua, St Kitt’s-Nevis, Dominica, and Montserrat swiftly 
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agreed to the terms negotiated at Ottawa. The Canadian Parliament ratified the 
agreement with little debate.95  
For reasons that were obscure to contemporaries, the Legislative Assembly of 
the Bahamas opted not to send a representative to the Ottawa conference.  As a result, 
the Bahamas were not party of the agreement. C.P. Lucas of the Colonial Office 
attributed the failure of the Bahamas to appoint a delegate to the colony’s single-
minded obsession with political union with Canada.96 There was a certain amount of 
truth in this analysis, for a resolution passed by a public meeting in Nassau on 13 
February 1912 ignored the ongoing trade talks and had focused on confederation with 
Canada.97 Other factors behind the Bahamian decision not to ratify the agreement 
included fear of American tariff retaliation and  the clause stipulating that preference 
would only be extended to goods shipped between Canada and the West Indies via 
direct routes. Bahamians objected to this restriction because it precluded shipping 
goods in bond to Canada via American railways.98  
 The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 appears to have pushed the 
concept of Canada West Indian union from the mind of Thomas Macaulay. Busy with 
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various patriotic causes in Montreal, he had little time for West Indian projects. The 
high point of his wartime career came in 1917, when he became Chairman of the 
National Committee on Food Resources.99 However, interest in bringing the British 
West Indies into Confederation did not evaporate entirely during the conflict. Toronto 
lumber exporter Harry Crowe suggested to Borden that they be made Canadian 
provinces. Crowe argued that the ‘intelligent coloured professional men’ of Jamaica 
would help ‘adorn’ the Canadian Parliament.100 Crowe’s relatively liberal assumptions 
were not shared by those in power. Robert Borden’s wartime conversations with 
Lloyd George on the subject of Canada-West Indian union revealed that both men 
envisioned the West Indies as colonial territories ruled by Canada; there were to be no 
MPs from the West Indies, coloured, intelligent, or otherwise sitting in Ottawa.101 
None of the official discussions of Canada West India union contemplated anything 
resembling provincial status for the non-white colonies.  
The armistice in November 1918 re-awakened Macaulay’s interest in Canada’s 
ties to the West Indies, albeit for just a brief period. In early 1919 Macaulay sent 
Borden a letter recommending closer ties with the West Indies and announcing that he 
was about to leave on a fact finding mission to the region.102  Upon his return, 
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Macaulay informed Borden that few in the colonies desired annexation by Canada, at 
least in the foreseeable future. Macaulay advised that Canadians should ‘abandon for 
the moment the idea of political union’ and focus on the more practical project of a 
preferential tariff agreement. 103 Taking his own advice, Macaulay concentrated his 
energies on lobbying for improved transport with the West Indies and reciprocal tariff 
reductions, two issues which preoccupied him for most of the 1920s.104 He never 
again raised the issue political union. 
Macaulay’s realization that it would be impossible to bring the Bahamas or 
any other British possession into Confederation dovetailed with a rapid change in 
thinking in Ottawa. In early 1919, the Canadian government abandoned its wartime 
plans for the annexation of Jamaica and other islands in the West Indies. As P.G. 
Wigley suggests, Borden’s ultimate decision to refrain from claiming any territory for 
Canada at the Paris Peace Conference was driven by complex diplomatic 
considerations, including the desire to placate the United States, rather than any liberal 
aversion to colonial rule.105    
The liberal aspects of Macaulay’s thinking underscore the difficulties in 
generalizing about the effects of membership in the British Empire on Canadian ideas 
                                                 
103 Macaulay to Borden,  27 June 1919, Borden Papers, C-4314. Macaulay did note that 
there was still widespread support for union with Canada in the Bahamas. 
104 Macaulay to Meighen, March 1, 1926, Arthur Meighen Fonds, Library and Archives 
Canada, C-3476; Macaulay to King, 4 June 1925, 18 June1925, Mackenzie King Fonds, 
Library and Archives, C-2278. Macaulay represented the Leeward Island when the 
Canada-West Indies trade agreement was renegotiated in 1925. The Depression marked 
the end of his interest in the West Indies: Macaulay suffered serious reversals in his 
personal finances and was force to give up his political issues. He died in 1942. Obituary 
for Thomas Bassett Macaulay, Montreal Gazette, 4 April 1942,   8. 
105 Wigley, ‘Canada and Imperialism: West Indian Aspirations and the First World War.’ 
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about race. Macaulay’s experience shows that on the eve of the First World War, 
Canada’s imperialists came in many varieties. Robert Borden’s imperialism was 
coloured by ideas of racial superiority, but Macaulay’s imperialism was not. There is 
little evidence to suggest that Macaulay was less of an imperialist than Borden, but his 
attitudes towards race were much more liberal than those of the Prime Minister. 
Macaulay’s 1911 campaign forces us to rethink a notion suggested by much of the 
British World literature, namely that the White Dominions’ membership in the British 
World intensified rather than diminished their racism. Had Macaulay’s 1911 mission 
to the Bahamas forces us to think carefully about the role of race in the making of 
Canada’s boundaries. It also raises an interesting counterfactual: had Canadians in the 
age of high imperialism been more tolerant of non-whites, Canada might have become 
a larger country and made the transition to multiculturalism at a comparatively early 
date. 
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